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A number of recent studies have again accentuated the relative poor economic 
performance of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). These show that Africa’s population-
weighted annual growth rate per capita was a mere 0.1 per cent over 1960-2000 and that 
it diverged from the rest of the world at an average annual rate of 5 per cent between 
1980 and 2000 (Collier and O’Connell 2007). Consequently, 35 of Africa’s nations, 
home to 87 per cent of all Africans, are still classified as low-income countries (Ndulu 
et al. 2007a).  
In an extensive study into the causes of this unsatisfactory performance, Ndulu et al. 
(2007b) describe four policy syndromes as central to Africa’s problems: state controls, 
adverse redistribution, intertemporally unsustainable spending, and state breakdown. 
There is substantial consensus that these policy syndromes are an important part of the 
explanation, and that institutional reform to improve governance is needed in Africa 
(see Fosu and O’Connell 2006).  
However, current international efforts to assist Africa’s development have converged 
around the notion that a concerted effort—a big push—is needed to get many African 
countries on the path of growth.1 The United Nations’ Millennium Project Overview 
Report (UN Millennium Project 2005: 19) calls for a big push in basic infrastructure 
investment in Africa, especially in roads, ports and energy. The Africa Commission 
Report (2005) calls for a ‘comprehensive big push on many fronts at once’, not only in 
infrastructure, but in governance, capacity-building and accountability to address the 
underdevelopment of the continent. UNCTAD’s (2006) also argues for the need for a 
big push in infrastructure investment through the doubling of aid.  
The case for a big push is made mostly on the diagnosis that much of Africa is caught in 
a poverty trap and that certain thresholds therefore exist, which cannot be overcome in 
an incremental manner. Various reasons for the poverty trap have been identified. 
UNCTAD (2002) contends that African countries are in this predicament because of 
their dependence on primary commodities, unsustainable debts and insufficient foreign 
aid. Collier (2006a) sees African countries as being caught in four reinforcing 
development traps consisting of a conflict trap, a corruption trap, a primary commodity 
trap and a fractionalized society trap. Birdsall (2007) posits the existence of an 
institutional trap in Africa. 
The implication of positing a poverty (or development) trap as explanation for Africa’s 
poor economic performance is that the economic growth process is subject to 
nonlinearities. With nonlinearities, initial conditions matter for eventual outcomes 
(Krugman 1991; see also Fiaschi and Lavezzi 2007). If this theory is accepted, then it 
must be acknowledged that even countries with identical policies (or identical policy 
syndromes) may have different development outcomes due to differing initial conditions 
(Azariadis and Drazen 1990). What are these initial conditions? Historical influences 
are cited most often (Nunn 2007; also in Ndulu et al. 2007b), and recent papers, for 
example, focused on the ‘colonial origins’ of unequal development (Acemoglu, Johnson 
and Robinson 2001). It is relatively easy to see how historical influences have shaped 
                                                 
1   Criticisms of the ‘poverty trap-big push’ argument for Africa are given in Jones and Olken (2005), 
Easterly (2006) and Kraay and Raddatz (2007).   
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institutional development in Africa, given the importance attached to institutions in 
explaining economic performance. However, one initial condition that has only recently 
started to receive attention is geography. Concern over the potential of geography as an 
initial condition which can give rise to a poverty trap has been voiced by Hausmann 
(2001: 45) recognizing that: 
the prevailing development paradigm—according to which market-oriented 
economic policies and the rule of law alone suffice to make all countries rich—
appears to be losing credibility. What if geography gets in the way of the 
promised land? 
In this paper it is argued that in addition to certain policy syndromes, there are also 
geographical syndromes central to Africa’s poor economic performance—and that 
geography can ‘get in the way’. From the growing literature on Africa’s economic 
geography, at least two such syndromes can be identified: the proximity syndrome 
which is the cumulative result of long distances to markets, being landlocked, and sub-
optimal agglomeration patterns, and the health syndrome which is, among others, the 
result of tropical diseases and adverse climatic and soil conditions.  
The focus in this paper is on Africa’s proximity syndrome.2 In reviewing this syndrome, 
it will be argued that there is an important need in Africa for regional cooperation if 
sufficient infrastructural investment is to be mobilized in a big push. Overcoming the 
proximity syndrome presents one of the strongest cases in support of regional 
integration and cooperation, but one that is most often not given adequate consideration, 
priority or articulation. Yet it has implications for the institutional design of African 
regional trade agreements (RTAs), some of which will be taken up in this paper.  
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 the importance of proximity as a factor 
overcoming thresholds in nonlinear growth paths is explained. In section 3, Africa’s 
lack of proximity due to adverse geography is examined, and the nature of the proximity 
syndrome reviewed. Section 4 focuses on overcoming the proximity syndrome through 
regional cooperation in four aspects: transport infrastructure, trade facilitation, 
decentralization and local economic development, and migration. The role of the 
international community in assisting these regional cooperation imperatives is discussed 
in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2  Proximity, productivity and the ‘big push’ 
Africa’s growth depends on the extent to which it can raise the productivity of its labour 
and capital. A fundamental insight from geographical economics, from which this paper 
proceeds, is that proximity is the central issue affecting African productivity. Here, 
                                                 
2   Studies on health and Africa’s economic performance tend to focus on malaria (Sachs and Hotez 
2006; Chima, Goodman and Mills 2003; Gallup and Sachs 2001) and on HIV/AIDS (Whiteside 2002; 
Gaffeo 2003). Recent studies on famine, nutrition and agricultural conditions are given in Geelhoed 
(2002) and Chopra and Darnton-Hill (2006); Masters and McMillan (2001). In the health syndrome, 
aspects such as nutrition and psychological health in Africa (e.g., burnout) tend to be neglected: the 
Africa Commission Report (2005), for instance, spends less than half a page on nutrition (Chopra and 
Darnton-Hill 2006) and none on the cost and impact of stress-related illness and mental disease in 
Africa.  
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proximity refers to proximity to markets, customers, suppliers, competitors, supporting 
industries, governments, etc. The proximity-productivity link has a long history from 
Adam Smith through Alfred Marshall to modern economics. Geography and proximity 
played an important part in the writings of the nineteenth century German school; for 
instance, the Berlin-based economist Willem Naudé’s (1896) studies on the history of 
trade in Europe between the thirteenth and eighteenth centuries concluded that policy 
lessons had to take the geography of the country into account. The need for proximity, 
and the role of geography therein, is therefore one of the most durable prescriptions in 
development economics. The birth of development economics is often ascribed to 
Rosenstein-Rodan’s (1943) promotion of a big push for European reconstruction after 
the Second World War. In recent years, the idea has been formalized in geographical 
economics, new theories of international trade, regional science and urban economics 
(see e.g., Fujita, Krugman and Venables 1999) and has found its way into business 
school/management literature (e.g., in the work of Porter (1990) on clustering and 
competitiveness). 
An in-depth overview of these contributions falls outside the scope of this paper. 
However, in order to justify the arguments and exposition of this paper, the essence of 
the idea should be explained. When economic activity agglomerates, it increases the 
proximity between economic agents. This has beneficial effects (static and dynamic 
externalities) that have been described as localization and urbanization economies: it 
allows for specialization and economies of scale to be realized.3 The impact of 
proximity results in positive feedback effects and scale effects. For instance, when 
production factors agglomerate, the externalities result in higher levels of productivity. 
The more resources are invested, the greater the returns-to-investment become 
(Krugman 1991: 651). Because of the higher productivity of these factors, more factors 
are drawn to the agglomeration, thereby setting in motion a process of cumulative 
causation (Venables 2006: 65). This process is, as mentioned in the introduction, 
nonlinear, and requires that a certain threshold level is reached before positive feedback 
and scale effects come into force. Therefore, a big push may be needed through 
coordinated government intervention, for instance, to steer the economy beyond this 
threshold. This idea has been formalized by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989).  
In many African countries, productivity is low because of insufficient proximity 
between economic agents. This adverse proximity has two dimensions: the lack of 
proximity (i) between African countries and international markets, and (ii) between 
economic agents within Africa, due to insufficient agglomeration of economic activity. 
Africa’s economic development will require the continent to make, as a minimum 
requirement, progress in two mutually dependent directions: (i) it will need to 
industrialize and move away from the dependence on primary commodities, and (ii) to 
                                                 
3   Localization economies refer to the benefits a firm receives from being with other firms in the same 
industry and is said to give rise to internal economies of scale. Urbanization economies refer to the 
benefits of overall scale and diversity and is said to encourage external economies of scale 
(Henderson, Kuncoro and Turner 1995: 1068). In addition to these static externalities, there are also 
two types of dynamic externalities, namely Jacobs externalities and so-called Marshall-Arrow-Romer 
(MAR) externalities, the latter resulting from knowledge-sharing, learning and imitation in a particular 
area (Glaeser et al. 1992). In the endogenous growth literature, cities are important for economic 
growth precisely because they provide the dynamic information externalities important for innovation 
(Romer 1986; Lucas 1988).  
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promote urbanization (Zhang 2002).4 Successful industrialization requires integration 
into the world economy, with African industry exporting manufactured (non-traditional) 
goods into world markets (Chamon and Kremer 2006). Currently, both of these 
requirements may be hindered by the lack of proximity resulting from adverse 
geography: Africa is characterized by numerous small, fragmented and remote 
economies. In section 3 geographical constraints of a first, second and third nature are 
offered as explanations for Africa’s proximity syndrome. It is also shown that these 
constraints, by increasing transport costs, are a contributing factor to the lack of 
proximity. However, before examining the constraints, it is worth sharing some of the 
growing empirical evidence which supports the existence (or lack thereof) of a 
proximity-productivity relationship in Africa.  
Van Biesebroeck (2007) finds that in Kenya, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, wage premiums 
in the least urbanized areas exceed productivity premiums in manufacturing, and that 
higher education does not result in higher productivity (which suggests that spillover 
effects in human capital accumulation are limited:5 it is often observed skilled labour 
tend migrate to denser agglomerations where labour productivity is higher). He also 
finds that exporting firms (i.e., those having access to international markets) are more 
productive and have a lower wage-productivity gap.  
Research on Africa’s limited success in exporting manufactured goods supports the 
proximity-productivity relationship. Medin (2003) argues that fixed costs make 
exporting profitable for only a subset of firms, and Jean (2002) shows that one source of 
such fixed costs may be related to productivity-enhancement (e.g., R&D, foreign 
networks, knowledge and intelligence, as well as firm-size). From this follows that the 
goods manufactured for export tend not only to come from localities where productivity 
is above a certain threshold, but also to favour localities with higher productivity in 
order to be able to export more (Bigsten and Söderbom 2006). Fafchamps, El Hamine 
and Zeufack (2002) find that in Morocco the more productive firms had self-selected 
into exporting. Higher productivity is reflected in the quality and type of goods that are 
exported. Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2005) construct an index that represents the 
income level associated with an export sector and observe that countries with higher 
quality (more productive) exports grow faster. Matthee and Naudé (2007) construct a 
similar index for subnational exports in South Africa and find evidence for the 
proximity-productivity relationship in that the sectors with the highest increase in 
PRODY values over the timeperiod of analysis were electrical machinery and 
apparatus; electronic, sound/vision and other appliances, i.e., production that generally 
takes place in metropolitan areas. They also find that the diversity of exports declines 
with distance from seaports.  
Studies on Africa’s geographical economics find higher productivity in cities. Naudé 
and Krugell (2003a; 2006) find that economic growth is higher in South Africa’s 
metropolitan areas and that this results from the higher productivity of human capital in 
                                                 
4   Zhang (2002) argues that urbanization is a key feature of economic development. Africa is the least 
urbanized continent—only eight countries are over 50 per cent urbanized. Its average population 
density (77 people per km2) is amongst the lowest in the world (Ndulu et al. 2007b: 101). See also 
Henderson, Shalizi and Venables (2001: 93).  
5   In dense urban areas as opposed to low-density areas, greater proximity increases interaction between 
people, with the result that human capital accumulation is faster because people learn through 
interaction (Glaeser 1998).  
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the cities that ‘allows the reaping of dynamic externalities associated with learning and 
information’ (2003a: 497). Naudé and Krugell (2005) note that the larger cities in South 
Africa tend to be more diversified, and that diversified cities grow on average faster.6 
Based on calculations of Zipf Law in South Africa, Naudé and Krugell (2003b) 
speculate that increasing the sizes of the country’s cities may result in efficiency gains, 
suggesting a positive role for further urbanization. Naudé (2007) finds evidence that 
urban density in South Africa’s central metropolitan areas has increased since 1996 and 
that these have, on average, also experienced higher growth. 
3  How geography gets in the way 
Before explaining how Africa’s geography is responsible for its proximity syndrome, a 
word of caution needs to be offered. The focus on the role of geography, as explained 
here, does not suggest that geography alone matters for development, or that pessimism 
is warranted because economic advancement seems to be predetermined by factors 
beyond human influence (Dixit 2007: 3). There is substantial agreement that institutions 
matter for economic development, and also that history, institutions and geography 
interact (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2002; Naudé and Krugell 2007)—but there 
is also a growing view that geography does matter on its own (Gallup, Sachs and 
Mellinger 1999; Naudé 2004; Dixit 2007). The purpose of this paper is not to get 
involved in the relative impacts of geography and institutions on development,7 but to 
examine what is known about the influence of geography on development in Africa, and 
to discuss the extent to which these forces can be minimized where negative, and to 
identify the implications that this has for regional cooperation. Once the distinction and 
interaction between first, second and third nature geography are understood, it will be 
clear that much can be done, in a concerted manner, to overcome adverse geography. 
3.1  The nature of geography 
A distinction is often made between first-nature, second-nature and third-nature 
geography. First-nature geography implies the inherent features of an area that are 
independent of human activity. It includes topography, latitude, incidence of natural 
resource endowments, agricultural potential (soil quality and rainfall), and tropical 
climate. Africa’s first-nature geography affects its development negatively through 
geographic isolation,8 its disease burden9 due to its largely tropical location10 (more 
                                                 
6  Diversified cities are seen as ‘nurseries’ for new firms and products; see e.g. Glaeser, Scheinkman and 
Shleifer (1995) and Henderson, Kuncoro and Turner (1995). 
7   In the words of Warner (2002: 1) ‘research on the causes of the large differences in economic 
development across countries has framed the issue as a competition between geography and 
institutions’. See also the summary in Naudé (2004) and Naudé and Krugell (2007).  
8   The Sahara desert has long been a barrier to overland trade with Europe (Sachs et al. 2004: 131). 
9   The eradication of malaria in Africa, where approximately 90 per cent of malaria deaths occur 
annually, is difficult because of climatic conditions (Sachs et al. 2004: 133). 
10  Tropical countries tend to have average growth rates 0.5-1.0 per cent lower than those of temperate 
countries. Furthermore, life expectancy in the tropical zone is on average seven years less than in 
temperate countries (Hausmann 2001: 46). In cross-country empirical studies, location in the tropics  
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than 90 per cent of SSA is located within the tropics), scarcity of large, navigable rivers 
and lack of alluvial plains, high evaporation rates, and the ‘curse’ of abundant natural 
mineral resources.11 The shape of the continent in terms of its north-south orientation 
has traditionally made technological transfers, especially in agriculture, between 
different climatic zones more difficult than in Asia and Europe, for instance (Diamond 
1997).  
Second-nature geography constitutes features that depend on the spatial interaction 
between people in an area but are not necessarily inherited. Second-nature geography is 
important in explaining why areas with similar first-nature geography may end up at 
different levels of productivity and income. This category includes population densities, 
population location and composition. Africa has the largest number of landlocked 
countries of any continent. Since being landlocked was an artefact of how borders were 
drawn up during the nineteenth century, it can be treated as second nature, although the 
size of the continent and differences in climate amplify the effects of border 
demarcation.  
Africa’s landlocked countries face a three-fold proximity gap: first, in terms of the 
sizeable distances to international markets and the need to cross numerous borders. A 
typical African country borders on four neighbouring nations (Ndulu et al. 2007a: 102), 
making border delays notorious (Zanamwe 2005: 8). Transport costs overland are also 
much higher than shipping costs (Hausmann 2001: 47). Whereas trade with the rest of 
the world is 30-40 per cent for the landlocked countries in Europe and other developing 
countries, respectively, this is on average 60 per cent less for SSA countries (Coulibaly 
and Fontagné 2005: 314-5). Landlocked African countries also trade up to 92 per cent 
less with one another than with coastal countries (Coulibaly and Fontagné 2005: 337). 
The greater loss of trade in Africa’s landlocked countries in comparison with other 
landlocked nations is due to the effect being amplified by two other dimensions of the 
proximity gap.  
Second, the proximity gap is more severe because of the small-sized economies in these 
countries. Africa is fragmented into 48 small economies with a median GDP of 
US$3 billion, the highest number of countries per square kilometre in the world (Ndulu 
et al. 2007a: 102). These small internal markets face difficulty in achieving gains from 
specialization, compounded by low population densities, low urbanization, and weak 
internal transport links. The degree of openness of a country may be influenced by its 
size (Spolaore and Wacziarg 2005: 332), and thus small international markets may 
reinforce the lack of openness that results from being landlocked. In this way, it can 
even create a proximity trap.  
                                                                                                                                               
or elsewhere is often measured by latitude. Latitude is strongly and positively correlated with per 
capita income (Bloom, Canning and Sevilla 2003: 361). See also Sachs (2001) and Easterly and 
Levine (2003). 
11 African countries with large mineral wealth have generally had poor performance, leading to the 
description of these countries being resource cursed (Sachs and Warner 2001). According to Younger 
(2003: 676) these resources have been misused by the elite for personal enrichment, or led to civil 
conflict for their control. Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006) find that a resource curse is not 
inevitable: with appropriate institutions it can be avoided. However, if unavoidable, it tends to have a 
particularly detrimental impact on countries with a ‘low degree of openness’, such as Africa’s 
landlocked nations (Arezki and Van der Ploeg 2007).   
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Third, the proximity gap of landlocked countries is further increased by neighbouring 
countries that are economically poorly performing, often as a result of conflict (Collier 
2006a). This creates a proximity gap in terms of reduced interaction among the 
economic agents of different countries (hence, low volumes of intra-African trade) 
which induces spatial spillover effects of very low growth. Collier and O’Connell 
(2007) quantify these effects. They show that for each percentage of annual growth 
experienced by neighbouring countries, the landlocked nations in Africa managed on 
average a mere 0.2 per cent annual growth in comparison to 0.7 per cent for landlocked 
countries elsewhere.  
In addition to being landlocked, a substantial portion of Africa’s population resides in 
the interior, basically for reasons related to first-nature geography. For instance, in 
Ethiopia, one of Africa’s poorest countries, 89 per cent of the population live in the 
northern highlands, a region covering about 45 per cent of the country’s area, because of 
its better rainfall, lower temperatures and less exposure to malaria (Benin, Ehui and 
Pender 2004: 167). However, through reduced proximity effects, the impact on 
economic growth is negative. It has been observed that the growth rate on average is 0.6 
per cent lower annually in a country where the population lives further than 100 km 
from the sea than in a country where the population resides within this limit (Hausmann 
2001: 46). 
A further feature of Africa’s second-nature geography that relates to the interaction of 
economic agents across space is the high level of ethno-linguistic fragmentation. Earlier 
studies find this to have a significant negative impact on Africa’s growth (Easterly and 
Levine 1997). More recently, however, Bloom, Canning and Sevilla (2003: 360) 
conclude that once first-nature geography is controlled for, ethno-linguistic 
fragmentation becomes insignificant.12  
Third-nature geography concerns features of an area that are based on prior human 
intervention, such as the adoption of new technology, which implies that a certain level 
of human skills is available (see Ioannides and Overman 2000: 1). Here the pattern of 
city formation in Africa is important. Existing city agglomerations offer greater scope 
for new sustainable activities, because human capital accumulation is faster in cities. It 
should be noted, however, that both second- and third-nature geography is often given 
the initial impetus by first-nature geography. Warner (2002) recognizes this and points 
out that geography exerts important effects in agglomeration—for instance, cities are 
more likely to be established and to develop in favourable geographic areas. First-nature 
geography is thus an important factor affecting urbanization and city growth in Africa, 
the continent with the least number of mega-cities. 
Some of the more noticeable features of Africa’s underdevelopment thus have a direct 
geographical basis. Africa is also a conflict-prone continent, but the geographical basis 
of civil clashes and their persistence is often not recognized, apart from the widely 
shared insight that conflict usually takes places over scarce resources (e.g., Somalia), or 
for their control in resource-abundant economies (e.g., Angola). Strife in most African 
countries has a discernable spatial dimension. For instance, in Angola, Uganda, Côte 
                                                 
12  This may be due to the fact that the authors use latitude as proxy indicator for first-nature geography. 
This indicator is positively correlated with the homogeneity of population (Bloom, Canning and 
Sevilla 2003: 361).   
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d’Ivoire, and Sudan, conflict follows a north-south pattern, if not an actual divide.13 
Fafchamps and Moser (2003) find that geographical isolation in Madagascar is 
significantly associated with higher crime. It also has to be recognized that the 
continent’s geography will affect the peacekeeping role of the international community 
and related operations such as disaster relief (UN disaster relief for Africa is currently 
coordinated from the EU). Collier (2006a: 204), citing the example of British military 
involvement in Sierra Leone, argues for an external military force (under the AU–
African Union and UN) to ensure post-conflict peace. While this may have been 
possible in a coastal, small country such as Sierra Leone, the credibility of an external 
military force in maintaining peace in large, geographical diverse countries such as 
Chad, the Democratic Republic of the Congo or the Sudan is likely to be low.  
Ndulu et al. (2007a: 100) argue that these geographical factors make investment and 
productivity growth more expensive in Africa, where the cost of capital ranges on 
average between 15 and 20 per cent compared to 5-6 per cent in Latin America (Pfeiffer 
2007). Of course, not the entire gap is due to geography, although remoteness does 
seem to have a direct effect, resulting, for instance, in capital equipment being twice as 
expensive in South Africa as in the UK (Venables 2005). Geography also renders 
agriculture a low-productivity activity: due to the relative scarcity of large rivers and 
alluvial plains, Africa has the lowest share of irrigated cropland in the developing world 
(Sachs et al. 2004: 133). Human capital is also negatively affected by the disease 
burden, which undermines productivity and capacity-building. 
3.2  Geography and transport costs  
In Africa geographical factors affect proximity and productivity through higher 
transport costs. A number of recent studies, including UNCTAD (2003), suggest that 
these are indeed significantly higher in Africa than elsewhere: at 12.5 per cent 
international transport costs in African countries are almost twice as high as the world 
average of 6.11 per (Naudé and Matthee 2007).  
Other evidence of high African transport costs comes from Ndulu et al. (2007a: 102) 
who point out that the median transport costs in intra-regional trade for a 40-foot 
container is US$7,600, which is about US$2,000 more than in other developing regions. 
This is even higher in landlocked countries. The Africa Commission Report notes that it 
costs more to transport a vehicle from Abidjan to Addis Ababa than to ship it to Japan. 
The World Bank estimates that significant benefits in intra-regional trade would be 
achieved by upgrading road linkages: for instance, trade between the Central African 
Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo could increase by US$10-30 
billion per year if road links were improved (Buys, Deichmann and Wheeler 2006). 
Africa’s relatively high transport costs are an important factor in the continent’s slow 
growth in exports compared to other developing regions (Amadji and Yeats 1995). 
Limão and Venables (2001) find that a 10 per cent increase in transport costs would 
                                                 
13 Civil conflict in Africa affects spatial patterns of economic activity and poverty within countries by 
disrupting the spatial integration of agricultural markets, deepening the isolation of rural areas, 
reinforcing the capital city bias in government spending and investment, internally displacing the 
population, making internal transport dangerous, destroying infrastructure and influencing choice and 
ownership of assets.   
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reduce trade volume by 20 per cent, and as much as 50 per cent for the landlocked 
nations. Trade volumes in these landlocked states are as much as 60 lower than those of 
coastal countries (Radelet and Sachs 1998; Limão and Venables 2001).  
How precisely do the geographical factors discussed above contribute towards high 
transport cost in Africa? The most obvious factor is through the continent’s great 
distance from world markets. Despite advances in transport and communication 
technology, distance remains one of the most important variables determining transport 
costs (Naudé and Matthee 2007). A 1 per cent increase in distance increases transport 
costs by approximately 0.25 per cent (Martínez-Zarzoso et al. 2003). It is therefore no 
surprise that trade volumes decline over distance, as many gravity model studies 
indicate. In fact, around half of the world’s trade takes place among countries located 
within 3,000 km radius (The Round Table 2004). In 1990 the average distance of SSA 
countries from their trading partners was over 7,800 km (Márquez-Ramos et al. 2007: 
20-1). Gravity models have estimated that the elasticity of trade with respect to distance 
ranges between -0.9 and -1.5. This implies that for a region such as Sub-Saharan Africa 
where the distance to trading partners is thousands of kilometres, trade will be 90 per 
cent lower than what it would be for partners within 1,000 km (Venables 2006: 65). 
Second, high transport costs in Africa are also caused by the fact that many countries 
are landlocked. Landlockedness has a significant cost-inducing effect, through rising 
costs of transiting various borders, as well as in the time lost at border delays. The 
median landlocked country faces 50 per cent higher transport costs than the median 
coastal nation (Hausmann 2001: 47). In southern Africa, bottlenecks caused by border 
controls have been estimated to cost US$48 billion annually (Phasiwe 2007).  
Third, Africa’s geography adds to costs through the inability to reap sufficient 
economies of scale. This hampers international trade, and keeps the per unit transport 
costs high. In many cases this reflects the absence of the effect of the home market,14 
resulting from a relatively low level of urbanization, low per capita income, and lack of 
progress in regional integration (Naudé and Matthee 2007). Most businesses in Africa 
are small micro-enterprises, and there are relatively fewer medium and large sized firms 
than elsewhere. Various reasons account for this predominance of small and micro-sized 
firms—low level of financial development, lack of skilled entrepreneurs, high level of 
risk and transaction costs, and heavy taxation of medium-sized firms (Naudé and 
Krugell 2002). But geography also plays a role. Lack of adequate transport 
infrastructure makes it difficult for firms to distribute products and thus obtain 
economies of scale (Acs 2006; Bigsten and Söderbom 2006). Fragmented markets often 
produce firms that manage to obtain some measure of economies of scale, become 
monopolies, and subsequently limit the entry and growth of other firms (Venables 2006: 
67).  
Fourth, the type of goods produced also affects a country’s ability to benefit from the 
economies of scale and achieve reductions in per unit transport costs. This is because 
different goods have different logistical requirements. Intermediate goods (which Africa 
imports in significant quantities) and goods such as fertilizer tend to have higher freight 
rates than other manufactured goods (Hummels 1999). The dominance of the agriculture 
                                                 
14 The ‘home market’ effect posits a positive relationship between export success and the size of the 
local market. See Krugman (1980), Davis and Weinstein (2003).   
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sector in many African countries can also raise transport costs due to the seasonality of 
crops. For example, distribution of maize needs branch railway lines to be linked to 
storage silos. Storage is expensive because, due to the undiversified nature of the 
economies, silos are used only during the season while their maintenance extends 
throughout the year. Often costs are compounded by fluctuating weather conditions 
which make prediction of crop sizes and their resulting transport needs difficult 
(Williams 2007: 70). 
The section above discussed the relation between first- and second-nature geography on 
transport costs in Africa. It should be noted, however, that high transport costs in Africa 
are not only due to geography, but also because of inappropriate transport policies. 
Policies regulating the domestic freight transport industry often protect inefficient 
monopolies, and fail to provide for intermodal transport facilities and maritime transport 
development. Policy ‘failures’ are evident in the dominance and expensiveness of road 
freight in many African countries despite the fact that rail transport can—and should—
be cheaper. Policy failure is also obvious in the lack of appropriate maritime strategies 
for Africa. For instance, ports are saddled with inefficiencies and high dwell costs 
(including loading and unloading ships and the cost of queuing for entry into port). 
Delays in African ports add to international transport costs: an additional day in transit 
for manufactured goods adds on average 0.8 per cent to the value of the goods 
(Hummels 2001) with chartered vessels costing between US$15,000-30,000 per day 
(Planting 2007: 79). The lack of a maritime strategy is also responsible for the reduction 
in national shipping lines and inadequate complementary industries such as 
shipbuilding, repairs and maintenance. South Africa, one of the continent’s largest sea-
trading nations with 3,000 km of shoreline, currently has only one national shipping 
company (namely Grindrod). According to Planting (2007: 78) this is because South 
Africa, as most other African coastal nations, does not have adequate policies, 
incentives and legislation in place for registering ships. 
4 Nearest  and dearest? regional cooperation and proximity  
What can be done to overcome the proximity gap caused by adverse geography? As 
mentioned in the introduction, most current analyses on Africa’s development 
challenges tend to concur that a big push is needed, especially in infrastructure. Will this 
help to address the continent’s proximity gap by reducing transport costs? 
A growing body of evidence suggests that investment in transport infrastructure can 
reduce transport costs. According to Bougheas, Demetriades and Morgenroth (1999), an 
improvement of 1 per cent in infrastructure could lower transport costs by 0.14 per cent. 
Limão and Venables (2001) find that poor infrastructure accounts for 40 per cent of the 
transport costs for coastal economies and 60 per cent for landlocked countries. Thus, 
better infrastructure would imply large reductions in transport costs. Infrastructure in 
ports—as well as policies to increase port efficiency can also—make an important 
contribution. International transport costs can be reduced by 12 per cent if the operating 
efficiency of a seaport increases from the 25th to the 75th percentile, and could 
stimulate trade up to 25 per cent (Martínez-Zarzoso et al. 2003). Coulibaly and 
Fontagné (2005), with a gravity model, find that if all interstate roads in the West 
African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) were paved, this could increase  
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trade threefold between member countries. The empirical evidence thus supports the 
assumption that infrastructure could reduce Africa’s transport costs. 
Most of the recent advocates of the big push theory also suggest that increased aid 
should be channelled into investment in transport infrastructure. They recognize that 
due to the cross-border nature of the necessary infrastructure investments, regional 
cooperation is essential. Sachs et al. (2004: 130-1) describe regional integration as a 
sine qua non for economic growth in the provision of infrastructure (ibid.: 150-1). More 
generally, regional integration through regional trade agreements (RTAs), for instance, 
can reduce the proximity gap of countries by increasing market size. This results in 
returns for closer proximity and higher productivity which, in turn, improve the returns 
from proximity by providing better foreign market access (especially to landlocked 
countries) and by creating a larger internal market (Spolaore and Wacziarg 2005: 
333).15 
This section further strengthens the rational for regional integration. Regional 
cooperation, although important, might be unable on its own to be effective. Binding 
agreements on trade facilitation to the WTO level should be considered as an alternative 
mechanism to provide incentives for regional cooperation. The emphasis is on regional 
cooperation rather than regional integration since the former suggests a broader agenda 
than regional integration which has focused on trade preferences and currency unions. 
Important as these may be, an understanding of Africa’s geographic constraints infers 
that regional cooperation should urgently be targeted to joint infrastructure projects, 
transport corridors, trade facilitation, and cooperation at least in terms of health, 
environmental, safety, ICT and tourism. Many of these require a long-term focus, 
distanced from the current situation of short-term crises and conflicts dominating the 
concerns of African RTAs (African Commission Report 2005: 62). 
In subsection 4.1 the context of regional integration in Africa is briefly reviewed as 
background. Thereafter, in subsections 4.2 to 4.5, the four priorities in regional 
cooperation—transport infrastructure and services, trade facilitation, local economic 
development, and decentralization and migration—are highlighted and discussed.  
4.1  Regional integration in Africa 
Regional integration has a long history in Africa,16 but one that has not lived up to 
expectations (Coulibaly and Fontagné 2005: 315). There are around 30 RTAs in Africa 
and each country is a member on average in four RTAs, resulting in overlapping 
memberships, with conflicting obligations, rules and procedures (Mutai 2003: 3). These 
                                                 
15 The insight that larger markets can raise productivity through regional integration and harmonization 
of trade, standards and procedures is well-established in economics, with historical examples. For 
instance, the economic growth and development of the Roman Empire have been recognized as being 
partly due to the benefits of integrating a large geographic area. In the words of Naudé (1896), the 
Roman Empire ‘constituted one immense economic unit, having a system of weights and measures, a 
common law, a unified monetary system, freedom of trade and, at least during the second century 
before Christ, a universal right of emigration’ (see Keasbey 1897: 512).  
16 The 1980 Lagos Plan of Action envisaged the creation of an African economic community by 2000. 
More recently, the African Union 2007 Summit discussed the formation of a United States of Africa.  
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agreements do not seem to have significantly increased intra-African trade,17 nor raised 
the region’s share in global trade, or improved its bargaining position in international 
trade negotiations (MG Online 2007). In addition RTAs may result in significant trade 
diversion (Carrère 2004; Sandrey 2006).18 
One of the apparent failures of RTAs in Africa has been their inability to reduce the 
proximity gap. As discussed in section 3, three factors conspire to create a proximity 
gap between African countries (especially the landlocked states) and other nations: 
namely, borders, small sized economies, and neighbourhood effects. However, on closer 
scrutiny, it is possible that the poor results of regional integration are a result of these 
schemes becoming trapped by the proximity gap. Elsewhere in the world successful 
regional integration has been driven by increasing trade volumes between member 
countries (Mutai 2003: 6) but in Africa, the lack of transport infrastructure (and the 
attendant high transport costs) have stifled trade,19 dampening all incentive to commit 
to regional integration, the construction and maintenance of transport infrastructure 
included. This in turn has contributed to low trade (which also explains why national 
governments are slow to implement regional-level reforms).  
Reducing the proximity gap will require that at least four issues be prioritized in 
regional cooperation: transport infrastructure, trade facilitation, decentralization and 
local economic development, and migration. These are discussed next. 
4.2  Transport infrastructure and services 
In the past, the problem with infrastructure investment in Africa has been its 
fragmented, uncoordinated, and predominantly national focus. However, transport 
infrastructure, such as roads, is shaped by three important effects which necessitate a 
regional scale and region-wide coordination: (i) network effects, (ii) threshold effects, 
and (iii) compatibility requirements. 
Network effects are obtained when the value of a good or service increases with the 
number of users of the item in question. Direct network effects refer to the immediate 
benefits from the good or service itself (such as lower travel times due to a road) and 
indirect network effects refer to benefits accruing from the added availability of 
complimentary goods (such as vehicles in the case of roads) (Liebowitz and Margolis 
                                                 
17 Intra-African trade levels are low, approximately 10 per cent of total external trade. Recent increases 
have not been ascribed to a general expansion of trade, but are rather considered to result from an 
expansion in Nigerian oil and South African exports’ to the continent after 1994, as well as the 
success of Kenyan manufacturing exports to east Africa. Carrère (2004) using panel data gravity 
models finds evidence that regional integration had increased intra-African trade, with effects stronger 
(and with less trade diversion) where regional integration consists of both preferential trade 
agreements and the introduction of a common currency. 
18 A large literature deals with regional integration in Africa. The focus tends to be on the monetary 
aspects of currency unions and whether macroeconomic policies and outcomes are converging (see 
Carmignani 2005). There is a need for more research on regional integration and the proximity gap 
outlined in this paper. 
19 Other reasons highlighted in the literature include the similarity of production structures (implying an 
underlying lack of trade potential), currency restrictions and porous borders (resulting in unrecorded 
and illegal trade).  
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1998). In view of the current levels of economic activity in most individual African 
states and the existing patterns of road-carrier trade, consideration of road investment 
and financing only on the basis of local (national) demand will suggest that there is no 
justification for the investment of such a road infrastructure. However, as Buys, 
Deichmann and Wheeler (2006) show, taking a network approach will often indicate 
otherwise, with region-wide benefits exceeding local cost. They examine the World 
Bank’s proposed 100,000 km trans-Africa road network to link 83 major SSA cities. 
The cost of this proposed network is in the vicinity of US$32 billion over 15 years, 
which is small compared to the expected increase in trade between these countries of 
over US$250 billion. Network effects imply that returns to infrastructure investment 
will rise with population density (Ndulu et al. 2007a: 104). 
Threshold effects have been defined as ‘a particular sort of causal relationship in which 
the magnitude of the causal influence changes dramatically past some critical point’ 
(Galster, Quercia and Cortes 2000: 703). It implies a nonlinear relationship between 
variables. In the relationship between road transport investment and trade, two types of 
feedback effects can come into play: first, transport infrastructure is endodynamic, 
meaning that if the level thereof reaches a certain threshold, it subsequently causes a 
much greater change in itself, because of the direct effects of networks. And second, 
transport infrastructure is exodynamically related to trade volumes, meaning that after a 
certain plateau, increases therein will lead to much greater trade volumes (Galster, 
Quercia and Cortes 2000: 704-5).  
Given the attendant network and threshold effects, transport infrastructure and services 
should not be studied at the level of the individual link, but rather at the level of the 
entire logistic chain (Pedersen 2001: 87). Also, network and threshold effects imply that 
a particular quality standard or product standardization is required before a transport 
link can meet its expectations (Sachs 2005: 250). A case in point is that in many 
instances Africa’s transport infrastructure—because of the nature of its exports (bulk 
goods) that differs from the nature of its imports (containerized)—cannot as yet make 
optimal use of containers (one of the most important innovations in international trade 
that has greatly facilitated the integration of different modes of transport) (Pedersen 
2001: 87). Thus more containers enter Africa through imports than exit through exports. 
Containers are generally not used in inland transportation, but are unpacked at ports 
(according to customs regulations). Pedersen (2001: 88) argues that greater 
containerization of bulk/primary commodities in African trade could have three 
advantages: (i) reducing transport costs by achieving a better balance between container 
inflow and outflow; (ii) improving the integration between different modes of transport, 
a requirement for the smooth functioning of the logistics chain, and (iii) contributing to 
a more continuous export of primary goods as goods could be shipped as soon as a 
container is filled (rather than wait for a vessel to be loaded, as in the case of bulk 
exports). 
The need for regional cooperation in infrastructure arises for a third reason, namely the 
need to ensure greater compatibility in transport systems, infrastructure and security. In 
all modes of transport, greater coordination and compatibility are required between 
countries. There are currently at least four different rail gauges in Africa, a fact which 
makes rail connections between many countries impossible (Phasiwe 2007). In road 
freight transport, which in many cases is even more important that rail transport, axle 
sizes and axle load regulations differ substantially from one country to the next 
(Zanamwe 2005: 40). Custom requirements differ between countries and are often  
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unrealistic (ibid.: 40). Freight insecurity, especially train thefts, is reducing trade and 
costing money, as freight forwarders prefer the more expensive option of road hauling 
which enables trucks and freight to be better guarded and tracked via satellite.  
Finally, coordination is also required for tourism.20 This is a growing market in which 
Africa enjoys a potential comparative advantage but one that requires greater 
investment in infrastructure, including air, rail and road transport systems (Naudé and 
Saayman 2005). For instance, regional tourism agencies have demanded uniform road 
signs to facilitate tourist traffic and reduce accidents.  
Despite the impact achieved through network effects, threshold effects and through the 
compatibility for assuring regional coordination in transport infrastructure investment 
and in trade facilitation (see 4.3 below), mechanisms to ensure this coordination are also 
needed, since the incentives for coordination are often not symmetrical.21 There are at 
least three reasons behind such asymmetrical benefits. 
First, in the case of transport infrastructure that would connect interior economies with 
the coast, benefits are often smaller for the coastal country than for the landlocked state. 
Consider, for example, Malawi, a landlocked country, which ended up paying for road 
rehabilitation in Tanzania, in order to obtain better access to the Dar Es Salaam harbour. 
Similarly, there is less incentive for Kenya and Tanzania to invest in road corridors 
from the eastern seaboard to the landlocked countries of central Africa (e.g., Burundi, 
eastern DRC, Malawi, Rwanda and Uganda).  
Second, customs officials in many countries have a negative attitude towards transit 
trade as it does not generate revenue for their country (Zanamwe 2005: 38). Transit 
trade creates the risk that these goods may be diverted to the transit country. It also 
creates opportunities for smuggling, generating the need for trade guarantees that often 
cannot be met due to poor development of banking and insurance facilities (ibid.: 40-1).  
Third, the political orientation of African leadership towards RTA needs to change. In 
the past it has often been driven by political motivation to reduce Africa’s dependence 
on the international community. Investment in international transport infrastructure, 
therefore, was not a priority (Mutai 2003: 23). 
Given that the incentives for coordination are not symmetrical, there is a danger that 
commitments in RTAs lack creditability—more likely, however, this danger may be due 
to the lack of third party enforcement (Dixit 2007: 9; Acemoglu 2003). As a 
                                                 
20 Naudé and Saayman (2005: 371) note that there is a clear geographical pattern to tourism flows to 
Africa—northern node (consisting of Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt) and the southern node which 
encompasses South Africa and Mauritius. West and central Africa have the lowest numbers of arrivals 
on the continent (ibid.: 19). These are also the areas closest to the tropics, with the highest incidence 
of malaria and other tropical diseases. Only a few African destinations can offer the ‘sun and beach’ 
holidays for international tourists, since many are landlocked and the cold Benguella sea current 
makes the conditions on the south-west coast unpleasant. 
21 Asymmetrical advantages from joint infrastructure as well as jockeying for position within regional 
bodies are likely to create conflicting strategies from partner countries that may delay improvements 
in regional transport infrastructure. This is already occurring with regard to ICT infrastructure in 
connection with the planned East Africa Submarine System (Eassy) undersea broadband cable along 
the African east coast which is being delayed by conflict between Kenya and South Africa for more 
than a year (Gedge 2007).  
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consequence, it may be argued that transport infrastructure should be included in 
WTO’s binding rules on trade facilitation so as to provide third party enforcement and 
thus improve the credibility of commitments. In addition the network of transport 
corridors should be designed and implemented in such a way that it maximizes the 
mutual advantages of landlocked and coastal countries—for instance, by fast-tracking 
transit trade. Finally, Collier (2006b) advocates that landlocked countries should 
‘recognize their collective interest’ to ensure that peer pressure is being exerted on their 
neighbours. Such peer pressure (through the AU, NEPAD, and ECA, for instance) could 
be targeted to compliance to regional agreements, international treaties, and general 
implementation of sound economic policies.  
4.3 Trade  facilitation 
Given the complex logistical chain linking raw materials with final consumers, trade 
facilitation should be interpreted in the broadest sense.  
Currently, the WTO perceives trade facilitation rather narrowly as the ‘simplification 
and harmonization of international trade procedures, including activities, practices and 
formalities involved in collecting, presenting, communicating, and processing data 
required for the movement of goods in international trade’ (Zanamwe 2005: 6). There is 
room for improvement in these areas in Africa, where outdated procedures, excessive 
documentation and lack of ICT contribute to unacceptable border delays, but the WTO 
overlooks the importance of transport infrastructure with its threshold effects in 
generating the very trade for which it is attempting to simplify cross-border movements. 
As argued by Zanamwe (2005: 7), there should be at least three explicit aims to trade 
facilitation: (i) to ensure appropriate physical infrastructure and facilities for the 
movement of goods; (ii) to ensure the harmonization and effectiveness of custom 
procedures and (iii) to ensure the upgrading of information and communication 
technology for the exchange of trade-related information. 
Within the WTO negotiations on global rules for trade facilitation were started in 2004. 
Despite the importance of standards and harmonization in terms of transport 
infrastructure, the current negotiations seem to be limited on issues of transparency and 
the administration of trade regulations. This suggests that African priorities may be 
overlooked in these negotiations. Zanamwe (2005: 5) considers this to be a particular 
challenge to Africa, stating that: 
for African countries to participate fully in these negotiations means that they 
have a lot of catching up to do. Not only are they required to study and analyse 
the implications of the proposals on the table, but also to formulate proposals 
which reflect their trade facilitation needs and priorities.  
It is important that African countries commit to broad and binding rules on trade 
facilitation. Country resistance to this could be reduced by linking these commitments 
to foreign aid, especially technical assistance and capacity-building. 
Within the broader definition of trade facilitation, African countries also need to extend 
their focus beyond intra-regional road, rail and air links. One neglected dimension in the 
region’s transport policies and infrastructure is maritime trade. Joint efforts and 
coordinated plans towards securing greater efficiency in maritime transport may be  
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called for. One shortcoming that countries could address through regional cooperation 
is, first, the lack of national shipping lines, and second, the concentration of shipping to 
a few operators. Both of these facts may be raising shipping costs to and from Africa. 
With regard to shipping lines, the industry is dominated by two (the result of a takeover 
of South African Safmarine by Danish Maersk and the takeover of British OTAL by 
French Delmas, both in 1999). These two large shipping lines have entered into 
collaboration with a few smaller lines such as P&O and WAL. This concentration may 
generate increasing shipping costs (Pedersen 2001: 90) from a level that already may be 
significantly higher than in other developing regions (Naudé 2001).  
4.4  Decentralization and local economic development  
Current literature on spatial disparities and Africa focuses on the first (top) level of 
aggregation and generally explains the continent’s lagging position in income and 
wealth compared to the rest of the world in terms of its geography. The second 
dimension of spatial inequalities within countries, however, is relatively neglected, but 
can be argued to be almost as important for the overall economic development as 
geography (Naudé 2003; Jansen van Rensburg and Naudé 2007). A subnational 
approach to Africa’s spatial inequalities also highlights the necessity of different regions 
stretching across national borders to start planning and coordinating their initiatives for 
economic development (Kleynhans, Naudé and Van der Merwe 2003). It also 
emphasizes the importance of domestic transport costs and domestic transport 
infrastructure for economic development. Elbadawi, Mengistae and Zeufack (2006) find 
that domestic transport costs are an even stronger constraint on exports than 
international transport costs. 
The proximity-productivity relationship implies that greater spatial concentration is 
necessary to allow the advantages of economies of scale and industrial specialization to 
be reaped, and that this spatial concentration is beneficial for conserving scare 
infrastructure investment to a few key places. This does not mean, however, that 
upgrading infrastructure in the rest of a country should be neglected. A number of 
obstacles against domestic (non-international) transport infrastructure exist.  
First, given the large number of civil clashes in Africa over the past 50 years, conflict 
has had a major impact on transport infrastructure. Conflict has destroyed infrastructure: 
governments often demolished domestic infrastructure deemed to be useful to rebel 
groups, whilst rebel groups sabotaged infrastructure to isolate the areas under their 
control. But despite conflict, international transport and communication channels—such 
as ports and main roads—have often been kept open. Finally, after conflict, the 
rehabilitation of infrastructure is often prioritized in the capitals.  
Second, African populations are fairly heterogeneous, with high levels of ethnic 
conflict. At times investment in local infrastructure is used to reward or punish 
particular ethnic groups or to impose central control over the countryside. Ethnic 
diversity also makes collective action for investment in public goods more difficult to 
coordinate (Collier 2006c: 8). 
Third, effective and efficient investments in local, subnational infrastructure require 
strong capacity at the local government level. In Africa, only limited progress has been 
made in fiscal decentralization and local economic development, with the result that  
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infrastructure investment tends to predominate in capital cities. Fourth, Africa’s internal 
geography is often overlooked so that the diversity of terrain, which needs to be 
accommodated in road construction, is underestimated. This raises costs, construction 
times, as well as maintenance of transport infrastructure. Fifth, internal network effects 
are ignored in cost-benefit analyses for transport infrastructure projects, so that regional 
roads, airports and railway lines appear unprofitable in terms of standard budgeting.  
These obstacles need to be resolved so that the greater overall growth originating from 
the cities can be shared across regions and that migration to African cities can be 
encouraged without increasing the extent of poverty as people leave the rural areas for 
urban centres. The recent experience of China, where rapid growth took place in coastal 
cities, adding to the widening inequalities of the interior, shows that benefits from city 
growth do not trickle down to rural areas (Kanbur and Zhang 2006). Domestic 
infrastructure within African countries could greatly benefit from fiscal decentralization 
and a greater emphasis on local economic development, promoting investment and 
locality marketing. Only when local politicians attempt to improve the investment 
environment of their localities, do they become acutely aware of the shortcomings in 
transport and related services. Thus, as a precondition to the involvement of local 
authorities in local economic development are the extension and deepening of 
participatory democracy, and the strengthening of the capacity of local governments, 
including institutions that can control corruption and self-serving councillors. (See, e.g. 
Rodrik (2000) and Jansen van Rensburg and Naudé (2007) on the South African case.)  
In Africa, regional integration schemes can create consultative platforms for local 
authorities. A good case in point is the Maputo/Trans-Kalahari corridor, which stretches 
from southern Africa’s east coast through to Mozambique, South Africa, Botswana and 
Namibia. In South Africa, local authorities—supported by their role and responsibility 
as enshrined with the country’s Constitution and by the control of their own revenue as 
guaranteed by fiscal decentralization—were in a position to maximize the potential 
benefits of this transport corridor locally where it affected their jurisdictions 
(Kleynhans, Naudé and Van der Merwe 2003).  
4.5  Migration 
Large population groups of Africans may be residing in countries and regions that were 
artificially defined and which should be ‘ghost towns/countries’ (Easterly, Alesina and 
Matuszeski 2006: Pritchett 2004). Therefore, mass migration as a measure to improve 
the living standards of these sectors should perhaps be given more positive 
encouragement and be incorporated within the regional cooperation agenda. Without 
migration, the costs of adverse geography are borne disproportionately by labour 
(Venables 2006: 73). 
Easterly, Alesina and Matuszeski (2006: 2) define an artificial state as one in which 
‘political borders do not coincide with a division of nationalities desired by the people 
on the ground’. According to these authors, most of Africa’s borders were drawn up by 
former colonizers and more than 80 per cent of these borders can be deemed artificial 
(see also the large number of landlocked, small economies that this created) (ibid.: 13). 
These artificial borders may limit the ability of populations to migrate, especially during  
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adverse external shocks.22 Pritchett (2004: 50) argues that improving the living 
standards of a population is not the only way to raise their wellbeing; people should be 
allowed the option to migrate. There is no denying that strong pressures for mass 
migration exist in Africa—pressures which need to be taken into consideration with 
regard to regional cooperation. For instance, Glaeser (quoted in Sachs et al. 2004: 231) 
remarks that ‘were it not for strict immigration laws in developed countries no one 
would be living in Sub-Sahara Africa today’. Pritchett (2004: 3) using Zambia as an 
example claims that ‘Zambia is a potential ghost [country]—but because people are not 
allowed to move across borders, Zambia is not an actual ghost with declining population 
but is a zombie country (not an actual ghost but the living dead)—trapped into low and 
falling income and wages by lack of population mobility’.  
Despite limitations on migration, the extent of out-migration in African countries is 
already significant. Of the estimated 150 million migrants globally, 50 million are 
Africans, the majority of who appear to reside outside the continent. When in-migration 
takes place to Africa, only Côte d’Ivoire and South Africa are the major countries of 
immigration. Migration here is driven by livelihood concerns rather than conflict (Black 
2004: 5).23 This is borne out by Konseiga (2007) who notes that the main motivation for 
out-migration from Burkina Faso to Côte D’Ivoire is survival because of resource 
scarcity in Burkina Faso.  
Climate change may encourage further migration. It has been estimated that even with a 
modest (1–2 degree) global warming, more than 60 million Africans could be 
significantly affected by increases in tropical diseases such as malaria alone; many more 
will be affected by declining crop yields in the northern and southern parts (Stern 2006: 
56-7).  
Migration is not exclusively an African phenomenon, nor is it recent phenomenon. On a 
global scale populations are moving (or attempt to move) from poor inland regions 
toward coastal areas (Venables 2006: 62). Given the proximity-productivity arguments 
made earlier in this paper, migration should be awarded high priority in the regional 
cooperation agenda. Explicit recognition needs to be given to the underlying forces 
driving migration and to the greater overall efficiency that the resulting redistribution of 
the African labour force would generate24—as well as to the implications 
of urbanization for the continent. Where (limited) agreements for the free movement of 
labour have been made in regional contexts in Africa, as in WAEMU, there was a 
                                                 
22 Although much migration from African countries is driven by adverse political/conflict situations, 
underlying geographic disadvantages are also a strong factor. In Africa a significant proportion of the 
population is dependent on the extraction and utilization of natural resource extraction which have 
finite horizons and/or are subject to external demand shocks For instance, if it becomes uneconomical 
to extract or utilize these resources, people will need to relocate in search of livelihoods unless an 
alternative economic base can be successfully established.  
23 Refugees are a relatively small proportion of migrants in Africa, and have peaked at 6.8 million in 
1995. African conflicts have resulted in much greater numbers of people being internationally 
displaced than refugees (Black 2004: 5, 10).  
24 Migration can also be a catalyst for entrepreneurship development in Africa, as migrants often save 
money that is used to start a business on their return. Remittances have also been found to have a 
positive impact on business start-ups in poor regions (Mesnard and Ravallion 2005).  
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significant movement of people: WAEMU documented more than 6.4 million 
migrations between 1988 and 1992 (Konseiga 2007: 198).  
5  The role of the international community 
Regional cooperation, as discussed here, could be supported by the international 
community in at least four ways.  
The first option is through higher levels of foreign aid, including non-financial aid, such 
as technical assistance, and linking aid to transport infrastructure with commitments to 
binding rules on trade facilitation. Here, the criticism and shortcomings of aid,25 should 
be acknowledged and consideration given to proposals on more generous non-financial 
aid (Chauvet and Collier 2006), and non-aid support such as security guarantees 
(proposed by Collier 2006a: 189) although these, given Africa’s geography, will be 
more credible if the continent’s transport infrastructure can be improved. Perhaps 
security issues for international/cross-border transport infrastructure could be a starting 
point. Funding for infrastructure should also be accompanied by complementary 
measures to reduce the potential for corruption in infrastructure construction. 
Corruption constitutes a significant risk that could reduce the extent, quality, returns on, 
and types of infrastructure investment, and could raise the maintenance costs of 
infrastructure as well as limit access to it (Collier 2006a: 199-202).  
Second, the international community should ensure full implementation and adherence 
to international law on the rights of landlocked countries to access to the sea. In terms of 
international law, important agreements that provide landlocked countries with access to 
the sea include Article V of the General Agreement on Trade and Transport (GATT), 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982, 1994) and the UN 
Convention on the transit trade of landlocked countries (1965). Zanamwe (2005: 38) 
argues that in many cases these have not been fully implemented, and that GATT 
Article V needs to be strengthened.  
The third channel is through the extension of trade preferences (special and differential 
treatment) to African regions. Trade preferences are advocated by Collier and Venables 
(2007) who base their argument on the need for African countries to overcome a 
threshold effect as a location for international production—because Asian economies 
have already built up a competitive advantage in this regard. Furthermore, the heavy 
investments to be made for transport infrastructure in Africa would need to be supported 
by higher volumes of trade. Trade preferences can result in a positive and substantial 
export response—as the experience of Mauritius (with its preferences under the MFA) 
and, more recently, that of many African countries with the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) prove. However, care must be taken in the design of these 
preferences to avoid undermining the ability of countries to diversify their export 
structures (Mold 2005). Gamberoni (2007: 2), for instance, finds evidence that some EU 
preference schemes have hindered export diversification, either by creating an incentive 
for countries to specialize in product(s) with preferential access, or by limiting 
developing-country efforts to open up their markets in general. 
                                                 
25  A discussion of the merits of greater international aid to Africa falls outside the scope of this paper.   
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The fourth area is though greater consistency in international agreements and trade 
preferences with regional integration and cooperation schemes in Africa. Currently, the 
EU is negotiating economic partnership agreements (EPAs) with regional bodies in 
Africa. Different agreements are in effect being finalized with SACU and SADC 
members despite overlapping memberships.26 In addition a trade agreement exists 
between South Africa and the EU. Not only can this process retard regional integration 
in southern Africa, but the fact of overlapping memberships in RTAs could result in 
complex rules regarding origin (Sandrey 2006: 42). These rules of origin can, however, 
have significant impacts on a region’s ability to take advantage of trade preference, as 
Venables (2006) points out. 
Through these channels, the international community can assist in the promotion of 
Africa’s regional cooperation on infrastructure investment. But changes in the 
international economy can also offer opportunities in the way that Africa’s regional 
cooperation approaches the current proximity gap. One of the most significant changes 
is the increasing importance of Asia in African trade, and in particular, the rise of China 
(Phillips 2007: 14; Zafar 2007).  
Traditionally, the European market has been vital for Africa (which is why the 
alignment of RTAs and EPAs is important). However, in developing its international 
trade position and networks, Africa’s relationship with Asia—and with China in 
particular—is crucial for success in managing its industrialization and urbanization. 
Perhaps too often the perception is that Africa’s main market is the EU, where Africa 
competes the ‘competitor’—Asia. In this view the challenge for Africa is merely ‘how 
to compete with Asia’ (Collier 2006b: 11) but Asia should not be viewed as a mere 
competitor—Asia is an important market for African goods, especially from the eastern 
seaboard. Exports to China and India have the potential of making a significant positive 
impact on economic growth in SSA (Phillips 2007: 14; Zafar 2007: 103). Studies have 
already shown that the growth of China and India have had substantial benefits for Latin 
America through higher commodity prices, cheaper inputs and growing capital inflows, 
for instance (Bizquez-Lidoy, Rodriquez and Santiso 2006). Similar benefits can be 
expected for Africa (Zafar 2007), and African countries are beginning to avail 
themselves of this opportunity. South-south trade is rising dramatically: exports to 
China and India have been growing 1.7 times faster than the continent’s total exports to 
the rest of the world. Between 1999 and 2004 exports from Africa to China and Indian 
grew 48 and 14 per cent per annum respectively. In total, 27 per cent of Africa’s exports 
are now destined for Asia (compared to 14 per cent in 2000) which is almost equivalent 
to the share of its traditional EU markets (Broadman 2007: 11, 2). 
Important lessons can also be learned from Asia. For instance, much of the transport 
systems over the past two decades has been transformed successfully in east and 
southeast Asia, and the development of Mauritius—often touted as Africa’s one 
successful manufacturing exporter (Bigsten and Söderbom 2006)—has much to do with 
the linkages to Asia.  
                                                 
26 Overlapping memberships of RTAs (the ‘spaghetti bowl’) are seen as a complicating factor and a 
number of current efforts—including the Regional Integration Facilitation Forum (RIFF) in Eastern 
and Southern Africa—are underway to address these (Mutai 2003). International organizations could 
provide greater support for these initiatives.   
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Africa’s geography, together with developments in international maritime and air 
transport, is making trade with Asia increasingly attractive. The technical advances 
made in new large container-ships and the growth of large transnational freight 
forwarders managing the logistic chains have driven the development of ‘hubports’ by 
large global shipping companies. Increasingly, Africa trade is being transported via the 
hubports in Asia and the Middle East, replacing direct shipment to its main market, the 
EU.  
Africa could also take advantage of Dubai’s development as a transfer centre for air 
cargo between Europe, the USA and Asia, and of Mauritius’s ambitions to develop into 
an intercontinental air hub for African-Asian trade (Pedersen 2001: 89-90). These 
advancements could give a further push to African airborne trade; currently about 25 
per cent of African exports are transported by air (Venables 2006: 61) and this is likely 
to increase given the opportunities presented by the growth of China and India. 
6  Summary and conclusions 
In this paper it was argued that in addition to certain policy syndromes, geographical 
syndromes are also central to Africa’s poor economic performance. At least two of these 
syndromes were identified: the proximity syndrome which is the cumulative outcome of 
long distances to markets, being landlocked, and sub-optimal agglomeration patterns, 
and the health syndrome which is, among others, the result of tropical diseases and 
adverse climatic and soil conditions. The focus in this paper was on Africa’s proximity 
syndrome.  
Proximity (to markets, customers, suppliers, competitors, supporting industries, 
governments, etc.) affects African productivity. Productivity is often low because of 
insufficient proximity between economic agents. This lack of proximity has two 
dimensions: (i) the lack of proximity between African countries and international 
markets, and (ii) lack of proximity between economic agents within Africa, due to 
insufficient agglomeration of economic activity.  
If Africa is to develop, progress is needed in two interdependent directions: the 
continent needs to industrialize and move away from the dependence on primary 
commodities, and it needs to encourage urbanization. Successful industrialization 
requires integration into the world economy and will require industry to concentrate on 
export labour-intensive manufactured goods. Currently, both of these are hindered by 
the lack of proximity. 
It has been argued in this paper that Africa’s lack of proximity is largely due to adverse 
geographical conditions which make investment and productivity growth more 
expensive than elsewhere. To overcome the proximity gap that has a nonlinear 
relationship with investment and growth because of the effects of threshold, networking 
and coordination, a big push may be needed, particularly in infrastructure. The cross-
border nature of the required infrastructure investments suggests that regional 
cooperation is important. Four longer-term issues need to be prioritized in regional 
cooperation: transport infrastructure, trade facilitation, decentralization and local 
economic development, and migration. Because incentives for cooperation are not 
symmetrical, there is the danger that commitments in regional agreements are  
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incredible. Thus, transport infrastructure should be included in WTO binding rules on 
trade facilitation to provide third party enforcement. The additional measures discussed 
for improving the incentives for cooperation included transport corridor design and 
collective peer pressure by landlocked countries.  
Regional cooperation should be supported by the international community through aid, 
through ensuring full implementation and adherence to international law on the rights of 
landlocked countries to access to the sea, through extension of trade preferences to 
African regions and though ensuring greater consistency of international agreements 
and trade preferences with current regional integration agreements in Africa. 
In conclusion, measures for Africa’s success in overcoming the proximity gap should 
include not only higher levels of urbanization, agglomeration, industrialization, and per 
capita incomes, but also—at least initially—greater spatial inequalities within Africa: 
between cities and rural areas, and between countries and regions. Such spatial 
inequalities will come about as a result of the imperatives of achieving economies of 
scale and specialization in manufacturing, and due to the benefits of localization and 
urbanization economies in expanding cities. Similar processes are playing out in China. 
As long as these spatial inequalities are supported by population migration to denser, 
richer areas, they should be seen as an important route for closing the global spatial 
disparities between Africa and the rest of the world, and could be a prerequisite for 
industrial success in Africa.  
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